Optimal linear taxation for economies with altruism

Main Article Content

Ikuho Kochi
Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Miriam Saldaña Hernández

Abstract

In an economy with altruism, households provide inter-family transfers that redistribute income by a market mechanism. Private transfers modify the distribution of tax burdens and the ability of the government to collect tax revenue which in turn affects the welfare calculus of a government that seeks to design optimal tax policy. In this context it is interesting to ask: Which is the optimal level of taxation for an economy with altruism? The main contribution of this article is the characterization of an optimal linear income tax for an economy with altruism. Moreover, we also contribute by identifying a set of results that seek to advice the design of public policy

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How to Cite
Kochi, I., Ponce Rodríguez, R. A., & Saldaña Hernández, M. (2021). Optimal linear taxation for economies with altruism. Noesis. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 22(43-1), 162–185. https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2013.1.9
Section
Section Varies
Author Biographies

Ikuho Kochi, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez

Profesora – investigadora adscrita al Programa de Economía del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales dela UACJ.



Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.

Profesor – investigador adscrito al Programa de Economía del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales dela UACJ.

 

Miriam Saldaña Hernández, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez

Estudiante del programa de Maestría en Economía de la UACJ


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