Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation

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Published: Sep 13, 2021
Updated: 2021-09-13
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2013.1.3
Keywords:
Fiscal federalism intergovernmental transfers tradeoff between efficiency and equity

Main Article Content

José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-9393-8764
Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez
Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.
http://orcid.org/0000-0003-0851-2687

Abstract

The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this question. The main contribution of this article is the characterization of optimal unconditional intergovernmental transfers. We also contribute to the literature, by providing empirically verifiable hypotheses on how the federal transfers from the central government depend on the interregional inequality of income, the distribution and magnitude of interregional spillovers of sub-national expenditures, and the deadweight labor costs associated with taxation and intergovernmental transfers.

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How to Cite
Carrillo Viramontes, J. A., & Ponce Rodríguez, R. A. (2021). Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation. Noesis. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 22(43-1), 84–103. https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2013.1.3
Issue
Vol. 22 No. 43-1 (2013)
Section
Thematic Section
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Author Biographies

José Antonio Carrillo Viramontes, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.

Estudiante del Programa de Maestría en Economía DE LA UACJ

Raúl Alberto Ponce Rodríguez, Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez.

Profesor – investigador adscrito al Programa de Economía del Departamento de Ciencias Sociales dela UACJ




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