Mediated causation: a contemporary model of social coercion
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to put forward a plausible model of social causation, which we term mediated causation. Since contemporary social ontology has been reluctant to consider the issue of social coercion, the first part of this article is devoted to introducing some basic conceptual distinctions that define the parameters of the model: which social entities exert which type of coercion and upon whom. The second part describes the general structure of the proposed model, indicating in which sense it counts as a model of causation and in which sense that causation is social. As a result, the model defines two conditions that must obtain in order to have an episode of mediated social causation: (1) an individual I successes in making another individual behave in specific ways, independently of the latter’s will (2) I successes due to the presence of entities such as social practices, positions, and relations.
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