Exclusivity and kinds of models in modulated disjunctive inferences

Abstract

The disjunction introduction rule, that is, the schema in classical logic that, from a premise, leads to conclude a disjunction transforming the premise into a disjunct of that disjunction, is a cognitive problem. This is so because people only use this rule on a few occasions. Therefore, any theory trying to account for human reasoning must explain this phenomenon as well. Based on the mental models theory, Orenes and Johnson-Laird provide such an explanation. In this way, this paper is intended to show that, although it can seem that their account is in contradiction with some essential assumptions and important developments of the aforementioned theory, that is not actually so. The key points in this regard that will be analyzed are the way the mental models theory really understands disjunction and the distinction that this last approach presents between Mental Models and Fully Explicit Models.