The tripartite extension of the dual-process theory and its implications for autism research

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Published: Sep 10, 2021
Updated: 2021-09-10
DOI: https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2016.2.10
Keywords:
Autism dual-process theory intelligence neurodiversity reasoning

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Miguel López Astorga
Universidad de Talca.
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5741-8350

Abstract

Stanovich (2012) proposes to extend the known dual-process theory of reasoning with a third field. His aim, with such an extension is, by means of a clear distinction between intelligence and rationality, to present a framework from which to understand the individual differences in reasoning. Since explanations about cognitive functioning of people diagnosed with autism based on the dual-process theory have been proposed, it may be appropriate to update these explanations by means of the tripartite model presented by Stanovich. This is done in this paper taking into account the guidance that the neurodiversity perspective offers.

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How to Cite
López Astorga, M. (2021). The tripartite extension of the dual-process theory and its implications for autism research. Noesis. Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 25(50), 245–262. https://doi.org/10.20983/noesis.2016.2.10
Issue
Vol. 25 No. 50 (2016)
Section
Humanities
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

Author Biography

Miguel López Astorga, Universidad de Talca.

Profesor.

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